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The Arab Economy in Israel: 
Dependency or Development? 
Raja Khalidi 
In the 36 years since the establishment of the State of Israel, a 
technologically advanced Jewish capitalist economy has firmly implanted 
itself in Palestine. In the process, the traditional peasant-based Arab 
economy of the country has been effectively destroyed in most areas and 
severely threatened in others. As a result, the Palestinian Arab economic 
sector in Israel today faces the issue of whether its continued relation with 
the Jewish "parent" economy will lead to further integration and 
subservience, or to development and autonomy.' 
The transformation of the Arab economy dates from before the 
establishment of the Jewish state, though it has been accelerated and its 
course altered since 1948. In British mandatory times, the transformation 
was characterized by the spread of private property in agriculture with 
increased small private and absentee land ownership. This, however, was 
not accompanied by a concurrent growth in capitalist agricultural 
methods. Similarly, though urban and industrial/commercia1 growth 
spawned a new bourgeoisie, this led neither to a shift in the terms of trade 
between the Arab city and country, nor to independent Arab economic 
bargaining power in the national and international markets. The main 
impediment to such growth until 1948was the presence and competition 
of an alien Jewish economy which possessed far greater abilities and 
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resources in technology, capital utilization and labor skilL2 
Subsequent Jewish development after 1948 bypassed those Arab 
regions that remained intact within the state's borders. The priorities 
accorded to Jewish advancement meant that high rates of capital 
investment, technological innovation and application, and international 
trade benefitted almost exclusively the Jewish population of the new state 
of Israel. Thus, while the Arab region in Israel may have increased its 
income and consumption capacities through exposure to the advanced 
Jewish economy, its position as a producing sector has declined steadily 
since 1948.It is in this sense that "normal" developmental processes have 
been structurally altered by the Zionist colonization ~y s t em .~  
The Arab economic structure in Israel is therefore characterized at 
once by features of subservience and autonomy. Even though it is feasible 
to argue that an Arab economic unit does exist within Israel, the task of 
evaluating its viability is neither a straightforward nor a clear operation. 
There are two aspects to this problem. 
On the one hand, the "smallness" of any economic unit does not rule 
out the possibility of it possessing productive capacities which can ensure 
both self-sufficiency and the power to trade and exchange.4 Any argument 
against Arab economic viability in Israel based on the relatively small size 
of the unit in question is not in itself convincing5 With the concentration 
of Arab society and economic activity in one geographic region and the 
maintenance of various productive capacities, it is possible to notice 
certain homogenous demographic, social and economic features. This 
further focuses upon the need for studying this population in terms of its 
constituting a distinct economic unit. 
On the other hand, the process of integration of an entire generation of 
Palestinian Arabs into the Israeli economic structure, and its subjugation 
to the priorities of that economy resulted in the dismemberment of much 
of the pre-1948 Arab economy. Any subsequent "natural" economic 
development was hindered by a number of factors. Prominent among 
these was the continuous attrition of Arab natural resources, primarily 
land and water. Additional government discrimination in distribution of 
~ ub l i cresources and utilities (capital, electricity, roads, housing, services) 
kept the Arab regions isolated from the effort of development of the 
Jewish state. Political discrimination and institutional obstacles, especially 
with regard to land ownership and usufruct, continue to deprive the Arab 
population of the freedom to determine their own appropriate course of 
development. 
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The question of viability cannot be fruitfully examined prior to 
establishing the basis, if any, on which the Arab sector exists and can 
continue to exist as a distinctive economic unit. This requires an 
examination of the main features of Arab economic activity in Israel: 
industry, agriculture and labor. 
This study aims at discerning the extent to which Arab economic 
behavior is effectively separate from that of the Israeli economy as a whole: 
is the Arab sector simply a regional or "national" branch of the Israeli 
economy, or does it rest on foundations which are distinctive and 
autonomous? Viability then becomes the relevant and pressing question.6 
In addition to the general "developmental" significance of this subject 
within the context of the experiences of less developed countries, there are 
other features of this part of the Palestinian people which merit it further 
study than it has so far received. First is the sizable proportion that 
Palestinian Arabs in Israel constitute of total Israeli and total Palestinian 
population. Also, Palestinian Arabs in Israel have maintained their roots 
and links in their land, villages and traditions, resisting attempts at 
dispersal or expulsion. Another unique feature of their experience is the 
fact that legally, Palestinian Arabs in Israel are full citizens of the state; in 
principle, the legal door has remained open to their enjoyment of the 
benefits of social and economic advancement bestowed on Israeli Jews.7 A 
fourth aspect of this population's status is the "modernizing" effect of 
thirty-five years of close contact with the advanced Israeli economy. In 
terms of development, this is an experience not gained by most other 
Palestinians or Arabs: familiarization with production and exchange 
processes often unavailable elsewhere in the developing world. It is within 
this broad framework that the importance of serious investigation of the 
Palestinian Arab economy in Israel must be considered. 
I .  Arab Demographic Development in Israel 
There reside today within Israel over 700,000 Palestinian Arabs.8 In 
1949,the Arab population of Israel numbered some 160,000,almost 14 
percent of Israeli population at the time, and some 12 percent of total 
Palestinian population.9 With a relatively high rate of annual population 
increase among Palestinian Arabs (3.7 percent p.a. between 1970-80),'0 
and with falling rates of Jewish immigration to Israel (and negligible Arab 
emigration since 1949), by 1981, Palestinian Arabs constituted 16.5 
percent of total Israeli population." One Israeli projection puts the Arab 
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population at 20 percent of the total Israeli population by the 
early 1990s.12 
This population lives in 106exclusively Arab villages and towns, and 
six mixed cities, including Jerusalem.13 The vast majority live in the Arab 
localities of the Galilee (in the North) and the Little Triangle (in the 
center). Under 10 percent reside in the predominantly Jewish cities of 
Acre, Haifa, Jaffa-Tel Aviv and Ramleh, and another 18 percent in 
Jerusalem.'4 Thus, over 70 percent of Palestinian Arabs live in exclusively 
Arab localities in Israel. 
Despite this effective "segregation," the Arab population is a majority 
in none of the Israeli administrative districts. Only in the Northern 
District (including Galilee) are Palestinian Arabs almost half of the 
population (48.6 percent in 1981).15 In this region, and in other areas of 
Arab concentration, most villages and towns are geographically close, 
linked by an extensive road network, and interspersed with Jewish 
settlements and towns. 
Though there have been few noticeable inter-regional Arab population 
shifts since 1948,there has been an apparently tremendous change in the 
distribution of population between "rural" and "urban" regions. This 
might be seen to indicate either substantial Arab rural-urban migration, or 
else an urbanization of rural Arab villages. In fact, all that the official 
figures reveal is population growth in the Arab areas without necessarily 
indicating any population shifts, much less urbanization (as understood by 
qualitative changes in rural socio-economic and demo/geographic 
structure). 
According to Israeli statistical definitions, rural Arab localities are 
those with a population under 5,000.On the basis of this definition, rural 
Arab population has declined from 58percent of total Arab population in 
1970 to just 30 percent in 1981.16However, while in statistical terms 
Arabs are becoming less rural, in fact predominantly rural/agricultural 
regions (with corresponding low levels of utilities and services) are 
remaining so, except with increasing population congestion. By 1981,of 
the Arabs resident in (officially) urban localities, over half were in the six 
mixed cities and the two Arab towns of Nazareth and Shefa 'Amr; the 
remainder were to be found in so-called "urban villages."'7 
The significance of Arab demographic developments is apparent in 
several respects. Most notable is that after 36 years, Palestinian Arabs in 
Israel have maintained their own geographic, demographic and social 
structure, which on the whole is separate from that of Israeli Jewish society. 
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This is indicative of an inbuilt resistance to integration within Israeli 
society as well as to an enforced segregation. Israel may be the world's 
Jewish melting pot, but it has not been that for its non-Jewish citizens. 
This has allowed for the preservation of distinctly Arab niches within 
Israel, extending in some cases to the realm of economic activity. It allows 
for the maintenance of an infrastructure, albeit weak and incomplete, 
within which the term "Arab economic development" can be considered 
relevant. 
On the other hand, the demographic picture is such that, with time, 
Israeli planners and policies must take increasingly into account the 
aspirations of a sizable national minority. The "demographic threat" to 
the Jewishness of Israel is regarded with serious concern by most Israelis in 
positions of authority, and has led in recent years to strident calls for the 
"Judaization" of regions of Arab demographic concentration. This official 
position could therefore emerge as a potential constraint on any 
possibilities for autonomous Arab economic development in Israel. For, 
coupled with the demographic and geographic homogeneity of Arab 
society in Israel, such a development might well be construed by Israeli 
decision-makers as the "cancer" or "mortal danger" that others have 
termed it.l8 
I I .  	The Absence of an Arab Industrial Base and a Commercial, 
Financial and Service Infrastructure 
The most striking aspect of Arab "underdevelopment" in Israel is the 
almost insignificant level of Arab non-agricultural productive activity. 
This reality has remained unchanged for years despite several government 
"five-year plans" to industrialize, which were generally misconceived and 
incomplete. It has contributed more than any other factor to the 
transformation of the Arab region into a consuming sector for "external" 
goods and services, with no concurrent development of a productive 
capacity that could affect the local terms of trade. 
As is well known, advances have been made in the Israeli economy 
over the past decades whereby an impressive heavy industrial base has 
emerged linked to a wide range of light industries. All are characterized by 
high levels of technological application, productivity, exportability and 
profitability.I9 
Israeli industrial development has been possible through substantial 
foreign and Jewish investment and aid, as well as the elaboration of a 
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strategy for industrial and economic growth engineered by government 
and private initiative. The central planks of this strategy have been: intra- 
and inter-sectoral integration; import substitution; a high degree of export 
orientation; advanced and well financed research and development 
facilities. 
With the main poles of this impressive industrial growth located in 
Jewish or mixed cities, and Jewish kibbutzim, moshavim and development 
towns, it has remained primarily a Jewish experience. Not only have the 
Arab regions and communities been ignored in the placement of industrial 
plant and enterprises, but they have been, and continue to be, regarded 
primarily as a source of cheap labor to fuel this growth and partake in 
consumption of its output. 
As a result, by 1974,at the most optimistic estimate, there were only 
59 manufacturing enterprises in Arab regions with some degree of Arab 
ownership.20 Most employed under 30 workers, though a few others 
employed between 150-200 workers each, in marble and metal works; at 
best only a fifth of the Arab industrial employed was found in these 
en t e rp r i~es .~~These plants mostly produce clothing and textiles, with 
some recent expansion into small chemical industry, and food processing. 
Generally, these plants in Arab regions are branches of larger Israeli 
concerns. Additionally, Arab villages are dotted with small carpentry, 
blacksmithing, sewing, car repair and other workshops. 
The same underdevelopment afflicts the tourism, services, commercial 
and financial sectors, with Arab entrepreneurship virtually non-existent. 
An exhaustive search of a list of the top 5,000 registered businesses in 
IsraelZ2 in 1982 failed to identify a single firm with Arab ownership or in 
an Arab region. Whatever Arab industrial development has taken place 
does not rate very highly alongside Jewish development. 
Certainly, the roots of this situation are partially specific to Arab 
society in Israel. Historic underdevelopment of Arab rural areas, 
traditional local unawareness of the importance of industrialization, and 
the absence of a "business entrepreneurial spirit" have played their role in 
perpetuating the stagnation. Whatever private Arab savings are accum- 
ulated, and according to some accounts these are considerable,23 they are 
either directed to conspicuous consumption or, for a part of the 
population, invested in agriculture. However, the most serious obstacles to 
Arab industrial development come from the position of the Arab sector 
vis-a-vis the Israeli state and Jewish industry, manifested on two levels. 
On the one hand, the state has been slow in its allocation of public 
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utilities (electricity, water, sewage and road networks) to Arab areas. As 
late as 1971, about half of Arab villages were still unconnected to the 
national electricity grid and by 1976,only one of the 104Arab villages had 
a sewer ~ystem.~4 This neglect is compounded by the relatively low level of 
state aid and grants made available to Arab municipalities and local 
councils. Financial aid per capita to Arab localities has been shown in 
official Israeli reports to be consistently lower than that received by Jewish 
10calities.~~ 
This initial handicap on Arab efforts to industrialize is reinforced by 
the fact that Jewish industry is a hard competitor in any case, equipped 
with experience and business acumen. Jewish industries also benefit from 
special state-sponsored investment incentives based on the "Law for the 
Encouragement of Capital Investment." Though Arab industry is, in 
principle, entitled to the same benefits, these are in fact difficult to obtain 
because of the way the Development Zones map has been drawn up. As a 
result, many important Arab areas (comprising roughly just under half of 
Arab localities p ~ p u l a t i o n ) ~ ~  outside twoand are the top priority 
Development Zones. Especially noticeable is how the borders of 
Development Zones leave the largest Arab town of Nazareth in the "no- 
priority'' zone, while the bordering Jewish settlement of Upper Nazareth 
falls within the second priority z0ne.~7 
The only real trend towards industrialization of Arab villages that can 
be noticed is that which is being implemented by Jewish capital. Recent 
years have witnessed an increasingly active move of Jewish industry into 
the Arab regions aimed at locating branches of existing industries closer to 
the source of labor. This is not part of any policy to industrialize the Arab 
villages, but rather to take advantage of cheap, primarily female, labor 
which otherwise would not have left the rural areas. This is evident in the 
fact that much of this sub-contracting has involved the textile and clothing 
industry which, after agriculture, is most suitable to female labor.28 This 
so-called "spatial mobility of capital" has been engineered by both the 
private and public sectors and resulted in the transfer of only parts of the 
labor process to Arab plants, thus ensuring continued dependence.29 
The serious lag in Arab industrial and business growth can be 
illustrated by comparing figures on the area of building completed for 
industrial, crafts, commercial and business use in two similar Arab and 
Jewish towns. In Nazareth, the largest Arab town, with a population of 
40,400 and a jurisdiction area of 8,300 dunums in 1979, only 7,800 
square meters of building were completed for those purposes from 1977- 
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79. But in Lydda, with a population of 39,400and a jurisdiction area of 
9,200 dunums in 1979, a total of 50,600square meters of building were 
completed for these purposes in the same period.30 
Within the industrial sector, therefore, there is very little Arab activity 
separate from the Jewish economy. In fact, the virtual non-existence of 
Arab-owned industry weighs heavily against the prospect of any 
autonomous development of the Arab regions. That industrial growth 
which has occurred is an integral part of the production processes of 
Jewish industry. On this level, at least, the Arab economy is clearly 
linked-and integrated within a subservient context-to the national 
economy. It posesses no attributes of its own (e.g., orientation to 
specifically local consumption needs), and thus can have no existence 
separate from that of the Israeli economy as a whole. 
III. The Stagnation of Arab Agriculture 
The major foothold remaining for the Arab economy in Israel is the 
agricultural sector. It is here that traditional Arab technical abilities are 
still relevant, that the major input (land) is still in Arab hands, however 
much its area is reduced (as a result of continued expropriation), and its 
use constrained. Also, in agriculture, some degree of self-sufficiency, or at 
least subsistence, is attainable. However, there are four areas in which 
obstacles remain in the path of development of this sector. 
Barring major political change in Israel, two of these obstacles are 
unlikely to disappear in the near future: the impossibility of any expansion 
of Arab arable lands; the problems of increasing the allocation of state- 
controlled water to Arab agriculture. The other two factors are not as 
intractable and could, in principle, be dealt with in such a way as 
significantly to transform Arab agriculture: investments in mechanization 
and improved inputs; development of more modern and efficient methods 
of agricultural organization, production and usufruct. 
Land: 
Since 1948, the Arab sector has lost the bulk of its land, especially 
arable areas, to Jewish settlements and projects, a process well docu- 
mented elsewhere.3' As a result, at the present time approximately 
half of Arab cultivated land is in the Negev Desert. Most of this is outside 
the minimum rain belt which means that crops can be obtained only once 
every two or three years. Of the remaining Arab cultivated land, much of it 
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is of inferior quality compared to the fertile tracts on the coastal and inland 
plains and valleys that were confiscated or transferred to Jewish 
ownership.32 Jewish-owned land is legally considered the inalienable 
property of the Jewish people; because of this, stringent control is 
maintained over this land by the state and its agencies. It cannot, therefore, 
be transferred to Arab ownership, and leasing arrangements are hard to 
come by and are usually annual and non-renewable.33 
With continued land losses over the years, and the isolation of Arab 
farmers from the benefits of Israeli technological advances, the area of 
Arab cultivated land (mainly poor quality, marginal plots) increased by 
only 25 percent from 1949-79, while Jewish cultivated area grew by 90 
~e rcen t .~4Immediately after the establishment of the state, Arabs still 
owned 31 percent of cultivated lands, but by 1979, this proportion had 
fallen to around 20 percent. 
The negative effects of this disparity between Arab and Jewish holdings 
can be observed in the following figures: from 1949-79, when the average 
annual increase in the Arab population amounted to 15,260, the average 
land area under Arab cultivation increased by 5,566 dunums annually. 
This precipitated a fall in area under cultivation per Arab inhabitant from 
4.4 dunums in 1949 to 1.4 dunums in 1979.35 Thus was agriculture 
severely constrained in terms of its ability to provide subsistence to a rural 
population once almost totally dependent on it. 
Water: 
The increasingly critical situation in agriculture is further complicated 
by the limited Arab access to water resources. In a country such as Israel 
where water is in short supply in general, it is not surprising that Jewish 
agriculture will receive larger allocations. This not only applies to the 
distribution of actually available water, but also to access to water 
conserving techniques and equipment which have helped Jewish 
agriculture supposedly to "make the desert bloom." Through the state 
agencies of "Mekorot" and "Tahal," Israeli water resources, like land, are 
legislated as Jewish public property, and as such their allocation is 
carefully controlled.36 . 
Between 1949-79 the area of Arab land under irrigation grew by 
60,000 dunums (from 9,000 to 69,000 dunums), while Jewish irrigated 
land grew by 1.5 million dunums; by the end of the 1970s, over half of all 
Jewish cultivated land was irrigated compared to only 8 percent of Arab 
land. 37 It is noteworthy that while most of Jewish irrigation is supplied 
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through specially constructed water distribution systems, most Arab 
irrigation is achieved through tapping local wells and springs. The effective 
bias against Arab agriculture with regard to water utilization is apparent in 
the fact that although Arab farmers cultivated 20 percent of all cultivated 
land in Israel in 1978, they only received 2.3 percent of all water 
consumed for agricultural purposes.38 
Agricultural Investment: 
Investment in agriculture, in the form of a range of mechanical, 
chemical and biological inputs, is an absolute prerequisite for modern 
farming. It is especially crucial where marginal lands are no longer 
available and intensification of cultivation is called for, as with Arab 
agriculture in Israel. 
With massive financial and technological resources at its disposal, 
Jewish farming has excelled in the application of various appropriate 
agricultural technologies: intensive mechanization, new irrigation methods 
(e.g., drip irrigation), greenhouse and plastic-cover cultivation, new high- 
yield seed varieties and well mixed introduction of chemical and biological 
inputs (i.e., fertilizers and pesticides). Many of these are actually 
researched and developed in Israel; increasingly, Israeli agriculture can 
depend upon local production for the supply of these inputs. 
However, data on the application of these technologies to Arab 
agriculture do not indicate that it has fully shaken off the legacy of 
traditional agriculture which is characterized by low productivity of rural 
labor and of land. These in turn are reinforced by increasing population 
without a concomitant increase in area available for cultivation. As one 
significant Israeli study of Arab agriculture has termed the situation: 
All inputs that are essential for increasing productivity of the land-fertilizers, 
pesticides, improved tools, etc.-have to be purchased. The farmer cannot 
afford thse inputs as long as labour productivity is low, and so a vicious circle 
ensues which cannot be broken by the sole efforts of the traditional farmer. 
This situation explains the third characteristic of traditional agriculture . . . 
namely, its unchanging character, or rather the state of stagnation from which 
it cannot free itself by its own efforts.39 
This account of the problems facing Arab farmers in attempting to 
modernize goes further than those advanced by other Israeli academics, 
which have stressed the "fellah mentality" as the cause for stagnation in 
Arab farming in I~rael.4~ But such accounts still do not go far enough in 
indicating the precise reasons that Arab farming has not been able to break 
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out of the vicious circle in a country otherwise well equipped to promote 
such modernization. 
A main reason why Arab farmers "cannot afford" the financial burden 
of modernization is that they cannot as readily benefit from incentives and 
aid granted to Jewish agriculture. Never has the Arab agricultural sector 
been the object of a concerted state effort to help push it out of the low 
productivity cycle; hence it is incapable of accumulating the level of 
savings needed for appropriate agricultural in~estment.4~ 
However, as several accounts have shown, when Arab farmers have 
had access to material or technical resources (through their own savings, 
local agricultural organizations or the services of local extension officers), 
they have proven to be as productive and efficient as Jewish farmers. This 
has been especially noticeable in irrigated areas or those where traditional 
crops were abandoned in favor of export-oriented cash crops such as 
strawberries, winter vegetables, and other branches, such as small animal 
husbandry.42 In general, Arab farming has turned to these labor-intensive 
crops at the expense of more difficult, less remunerative traditional crops 
such as olives, tobacco and wheat. Thus, farmers obtain better returns on 
the same or less labor input. 
Figures on the rate of mechanization, though somewhat hard to come 
by, point to the lag in Arab performance on this level. While in 1962, for 
every thousand cultivated Arab-owned dunums there were only .5 
tractors, compared with 2.5 tractors in the Jewish sector, by 1971 there 
were only .8 agricultural machines per thousand Arab dunums against 4.5 
in Jewish Though there has been an increase in Arab use of 
chemical and biological inputs, these are often (necessarily) restricted to 
irrigated farming. In the mid-1970s, field research indicated that 60-95 
percent of those who irrigated also used fertilizers and pesticides. Most of 
these inputs were introduced before 1966,along with mechanization: 
. . . mechanisation has replaced man and animal power as far as feasible, but 
the main tendency has been-and still is-the introduction and enlargement 
of labour intensive production branches.44 
Agricultural Methods: 
Finally, there are a number of institutional and historical factors which 
hamper the development of Arab agriculture in Israel. These are related to 
problems of land ownership and cultivation systems prevalent in Arab 
areas, as well as access to marketing outlets. An additional, but potent, 
factor is the absence of any significant Arab cooperative system. This could 
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play a role (as in the Jewish sector) in securing inputs, water, and access to 
new technologies, as well as in the improvement of production through 
the consolidation of fragmented and parcelled plots. However, a 
perception of the role of traditional forms of social organization in 
perpetuating these problems should not overlook the fact that in some 
cases new realities have emerged which in themselves prevent benefits 
accruing from cooperativization (e.g., the effect of land expropriations on 
the structure and quality of Arab plots). 
The question of problems in the present form of Arab agricultural 
organization can be looked at from two angles. On the one hand, the 
theoretical issues of "optimal farm size" and "economies of scale" have 
great relevance in the present context. Though a full theoretical discussion 
cannot be attempted here, suffice it to say that while Jewish agriculture 
benefits from the advantages of cultivating consolidated and large plots 
within the cooperative (kibbutz or moshav) system, the results of 
expropriations, private Arab land ownership, communal (mushaa') 
cultivation and inheritance laws have all played their role in seriously 
reducing the average size of Arab farms and plots. Thus, neither can Arab 
farmers determine an optimum size of plots (for maximum returns), nor 
can they easily effect consolidation of plots in situations where large-scale 
farming would be more productive and cost-effective. 
It must, however be remembered that the benefits enjoyed by Jewish 
agriculture in this respect were in most cases made possible only by the 
very same land expropriations which have so restricted the room for Arab 
agricultural development. However, most Israeli and Western studies of 
this matter conveniently ignore the crucial link between Jewish 
development and Arab underdevelopment in Israe1.45 
As a result of these factors, since 1949average farm size has fallen way 
below the (government) assumed minimum of 3 1dunums. By 1963, this 
figure had already declined to some 27 dunums, with the average number 
of plots per farm at 5.4, each with an average area of only 5.7 dunums.46 
What is most noticeable over the last three decades is the great increase in 
smaller sized farms and the decline of the larger farms, expressed by an 
absolute decrease in number of farms and cultivated area by nearly two- 
thirds.47 In more recent data on five groups of Arab villages (differentiated 
by regional and crop variations), the percentage of farms smaller than 22 
dunums (and thus by government standards, unviable) has increased in 
all cases. Of the 5,313 farms surveyed, representing over half of all Arab 
farms in Israel, 2,926, or 55 percent, were under 22 dunums (2 ha.); only 
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15 percent were clearly above the minimum viable size (greater than 55 
dunums/5 ha.), with the rest around the minimum viable size (23-54 
dunumd2.1-5 ha.).48 
The other aspect of the problem of Arab agricultural organization is 
the failure-for a variety of social, political and legal reasons-of 
cooperativization to make any serious inroads into the Arab sector. Of the 
190 Arab cooperatives in 1977, 124 were for securing drinking and 
irrigation water (often because of the great expense incurred in connecting 
localities to the national network), and only 13 were for general 
agricultural purp0ses.4~ The rest were mainly for consumers, housing, 
transportation, and electricity supply. These figures contrast sharply with 
those for Jewish agriculture. 
Because of their effective exclusion from active participation in key 
agricultural organizations in Israel, "Arab farmers suffer severe losses as a 
result of the unorganized marketing of their products through merchants 
who control the means of transport, the sources of credit, et~."~O In the 
Jewish sector, producers can depend on cost cutting central purchasing 
and marketing facilities, financial assistance and support in mechanization, 
irrigation and intensification schemes. These collective-cooperative 
organizations also defend their members' interests with the state and other 
agencies such as AGREXCO (the monopoly agricultural export board), 
and TNUVA (the national cooperative body), as well as the various 
agricultural production and marketing boards. They can also press for 
increased water allocations, export subsidies, land leasing and other 
farming needs. The Arab farmers, however, cannot avoid dealing along the 
lines set down by these agencies. Since the Arab sector does not act as a 
unified economic unit in its dealings with the "parent" economy, it is 
instead forced to conduct business on an individual and isolated basis 
through various commercial middlemen and sub-contractors. 
While it is difficult to discern what contribution each of the above- 
mentioned factors have made to the stagnation of Arab agriculture, there 
is no doubt that their cumulative effect has perpetuated its "under- 
development." By at least two different measures, productivity differ- 
entials between Arab and Jewish agriculture are historically wide and have 
grown over the years. 
Whereas in 1952/53, the gross productivity per worker in Arab 
agriculture (in terms of output) was 30 percent of that in Jewish 
agriculture, this figure had dropped to 20 percent by 1962/63; by 
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1975/76, it had reached an all time low of 16percent.51 Another measure 
of value of output per cultivated dunum (which perhaps better reflects 
land, input and distribution productivity) tells the same story. While the 
value of Arab agricultural output per dunum cultivated was 30 percent 
that of Jewish cultivated dunum in 1965/66, it had fallen to 18percent by 
1978/79 (and had already reached even lower levels in preceding years).52 
Another indicator shows that the share of Arab output from total output 
in the same period fell from 5.1 percent to 4.4 percent despite the fact that 
Arabs cultivated 20 percent of all farming land.53 
However much the underdevelopment of Arab agriculture can be 
ascribed to the nature of its relation to the national economy, it is not in 
quite as weak a position as the non-agricultural productive base. This is 
because Arab farmers still possess a portion of the main input (land), and 
over time they have accumulated a range of skills. These allow them to 
maintain a certain advantage in competing with Jewish agriculture that 
Arab industrialists and entrepreneurs might not have over their Jewish 
counterparts. Additionally, contact with modern farming methods has 
allowed for some significant (though not wide-reaching) advances out of 
traditional farming techniques while also making use of an abundant 
input, namely labor. 
Therefore, in this crucial area of Arab economic activity in Israel, a 
degree of autonomous development can be perceived, however slow and 
partial it may be. Agricultural growth in the Arab regions has taken place 
within the context of local needs, resources and aspirations. As such, it 
cannot be viewed as just another aspect of Israeli development. Rather, 
Arab agriculture can be considered as a viable basis for overall Arab 
economic growth and long-term welfare. 
IV. The Arab Labor Force: A Reserve Army for the Israeli Economy? 
The final area in which the contribution of Arabs to Israeli economic 
activity is noteworthy is that of labor. By 1981, the Arab labor force in 
Israel numbered 140,000,constituting some 10 percent of the total Israeli 
labor force.54 Due to higher rates of Arab population growth, the Arab 
labor force has increased much faster than the Jewish labor force. But the 
rate of Arab participation in the labor force is low compared to that of the 
Jewish population, standing at 39 percent in 1981, with a crude activity 
rate of 21 percent.55 Generally, low participation is attributed to weak 
female participation, even though Palestinian Arabs in Israel seem to have 
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been positively affected by work opportunities and "modern values" 
which often increase labor par t i~ ipa t ion .~~ 
There have been two especially prominent aspects of Arab labor 
behavior in Israel over the past three decades. One of these has been the 
shift from agricultural employment which is primarily attributable to the 
decline of agricultural work opportunities in Arab regions, and the 
emergence of alternatives in Jewish ~roductive sectors. Whereas, in 1955, 
over 50 percent of employed Arabs were to be found in agriculture, this 
proportion fell steadily to reach under 37 percent in 1965 and under 12 
percent by 1981,57 a total decrease of some 10,000 workers over the 
period 1968-81alone. This was manifested in an annual decline ranging 
between 500-5,000workers employed in agriculture. In the last four years 
for which data is available, the absolute number of workers in agriculture 
has stabilized at between 15,000-19,000.58 
The fall in the percentage of Palestinian Arabs employed in agriculture 
was not accompanied by such a dramatic shift in Jewish agricultural 
employment. This would seem to indicate that if the mechanization of 
Jewish agriculture is chiefly responsible for the displacement of workers 
from agriculture (as many writers have assumed), this is affecting the Arab 
Labor force at a greater rate than it affects the Jews, However, as already 
noted, developments in Jewish agriculture (which in 197 1accounted for 
at least 50 percent of Arab agricultural emp l ~ ymen t ) ~ ~  are not the only 
determinant in the decline of Arab agricultural employment. 
It is not surprising to find that displaced Arab labor is moving into 
those sectors most appropriate to its existing skill levels, namely the Jewish 
productive sectors. Since the 1960s, there has been a strong and consistent 
rise in the numbers and proportion of the Arab labor force employed in 
manufacturing and construction. In the 1968-81 period, while these 
sectors only accounted for 8 percent more of total Arab employment 
(from 35 percent in 1968 to 43 percent in 1981), the absolute number 
therein employed grew by over 28,000, almost a 100 percent increase.@ 
Other sectors, primarily commerce and services, increased their share of 
total employment by a lm~ s t  12 percent, representing an absolute increase 
of some 32,000 workers since 1968.'j1 
By 1980,for the first time ever, industry accounted for the majority of 
Arab employed, taking the lead from construction which had been the 
largest employer of Arab labor throughout the Israeli building boom of 
the 1970s. Though the trend was slightly reversed in 1981, industrial 
employment appears to have firmly taken root among Palestinian Arabs in 
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Israel, especially in light of the increasing ttindustrialization" of labor 
processes in c on s t r ~ c t i on .~~  
Despite the potential importance (in terms of skill acquisiton) of the 
increase in Arab industrial employment, the occupational structure of the 
Arab labor force does not indicate a significant transformation. On the 
whole, Arab labor has failed to break out of the boundaries of blue-collar 
(working class) labor within the Israeli economic system: 
Perhaps most characteristic of the employment structure of Palestinian 
Arab citizens of Israel is their concentration in skilled manuallnon-
supervisory/productiue wage labour. They are distinguished from non-citizen 
Palestinian Arab workers employed in Israel (i.e., from the occupied 
territories), who tend to be concentrated in the unskilled parts of these labour 
categories. They are distinguished from Israel's Jewish citizens, who tend to 
be concentrated in the menial labour categories of employment. . . .63 
[emphasis in the original] 
The second prominent aspect of Arab labor behavior in Israel since 
1948 has been the exceptionally high rate of labor mobility. This has been 
due to the interaction of a group of factors: the decline of local 
(agricultural) labor opportunities, accompanied by increasing landless- 
ness; labor-saving mechanization, especially in Jewish agriculture; the 
growth of relatively attractive income opportunities in the Jewish urban 
sector; the enforced segregation of Arab rural areas and population from 
Jewish urban employment centers. 
From 1968-81,while the number of Palestinian Arabs employed grew 
by 60 percent, there was an 86 percent growth in the number employed 
outside their localities of residence.65 Of the total Arab employed labor 
force, the proportion working outside the Arab region rose in this period 
from 45 percent to 52 percent. 
One Israeli account in the early 1970s) presenting a much higher 
estimate than the official statistics, estimated that 70 percent of villagers 
were working outside their villages. This Arab pattern of moving to where 
work is available means that Arab workers are "vulnerable to any 
contraction of employment; the non-local Arab villagers will be the first to 
be fired. . . .'"j6 The daily or weekly commuting to the place of work has 
given rise to descriptions of-Arab localities as "dormitory towns" for the 
thousands of commuters. 
The trend toward ever greater labor mobility is also reflected in figures 
which show a consistent decline in the proportion of self-employed, 
employers and unpaid family labor in the Arab economy. Whereas in 
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1968these semi-independent categories accounted for 29 percent of Arab 
employed, the proportion had dropped to 23 percent by 1981, with 
family labor the smallest part of this category (only 4 percent of all 
employed in 1981).67 It would appear that fewer families can afford 
whatever marginal benefits might be provided by family labor, and are 
instead directed towards alternative income possibilities, concomitant 
with the already noticed contraction of local employment opportunities. 
In calculations made previously by the author,@ it was attempted to 
test the hypothesis that labor mobility was a function of three factors. 
Time series results (for 1969-79) associated the following determinants 
with an increasing supply of mobile labor: increased irrigated land; a fall in 
the ratio of ArabIJewish agricultural output productivity (in value terms); 
a shrinking rural labor force. Other possible factors, including land 
ownership, some status of self-employment, or the general availability of 
non-irrigated lands were found t o  have no  significant effect 
upon mobility.@ 
Other calculations regarding the effect of "urban pull" (as elaborated 
by Michael Todaro in his standard model of labor migration) revealed that 
Arab labor mobility is not primarily a response to the rural/urban income 
differential as held in that model. Rather, these calculations indicated that 
the "rural push" factor played the significant role. Whatever the Arab 
wage-earner "expects" in the way of urban incomes (as hypothesized to be 
important by Todaro), he/she has little choice. 
Hemmed in from both sides, by a stagnating agricultural sector on the 
one hand, and a modern sector that dictates the "where" and "how much" 
of employment on the other, the migrant Arab laborer perceives mobility 
as a fact of life, a necessity. Labor mobility in Arab economic life is a path 
to survival; increased welfare or incomes are perceived as secondary 
g0als.7~ 
A final indicator of the role of Arab labor in the Israeli economy is 
found in unemployment figures. In general, Arab unemployment rates are 
slightly lower than Jewish rates, perhaps reflecting the greater necessity for 
a less skilled labor force to adapt to new occupations and thus stay 
employed. But official Israeli analyses of the role of mobile labor from the 
West Bank in fueling the Israeli economy71 applies equally to Palestinian 
Arabs in Israel. From 1973-74and 1975-76,two periods of contraction in 
the economy, Jewish unemployment increased by .4 percent points and .5 
percent points respectively. The corresponding rise in the Arab 
unemployment rate was .9 percent and 2.5 per~ent .7~ During the most 
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recent period of crisis, while Jewish unemployment rose by .3 percent 
from 1980-81, the rise in Arab unemployment was by .6 per~ent.7~In 
these terms, the Arab sector appears increasingly as a reserve "sub-
economy" for the wider market: from it comes the mobile, relatively 
unskilled labor to fuel expansion in times of boom; into it goes those more 
easily expendable elements in times of recession. 
However, the dependency of Arab labor upon employment in Jewish 
centers should not obscure the fact that there is another side to the 
relationship. While recent years have witnessed a certain restructuring of 
the occupational needs of Jewish industry, construction and agriculture,74 
the overall dependence of the national economy on the crucial tasks 
performed by manual productive Arab labor cannot be ignored. This 
degree of potential Arab leverage within the national economy through its 
position in certain key occupations and sectors would have to be 
seriously considered by the Israeli authorities were there ever to emerge an 
"Israeli Arab" labor organization independent of the Histadrut.75 This 
potentially influential position of the Arab labor force is strengthened by 
the existence of limited agricultural, service and small commerce 
employment opportunities in Arab regions. There is also a limited capacity 
for the extended family and communal structure to absorb otherwise 
unemployed labor in times of economic crisis. 
The Arab labor force's role in the national economy can, therefore, be 
seen to possess definite attributes of integration/subservience, though it 
maintains certain common and specifically Arab features (on the 
occupational, status, income, mobility levels), as well as a capacity for 
local adaptability and strong integration within Arab social structure. 
In what sense, therefore, can the Arab region and communities be 
considered to constitute an economic unit? And within which broader 
context can the viability of this unit be envisaged? 
This study has outlined the strains, flaws and potentials in the main 
areas of Arab economic activity in Israel. In each of these, agriculture, 
industry and labor, we have been able to discern elements of the 
conflicting trends of integration/subservience and stagnation, against 
segregation/autonomy and development. The motive forces behind these 
trends come both from within Arab society, in the context of its historical 
development, as well as from outside, in the form of Jewish domination of 
political and economic power in Israel. Yet it is not simply balanced since, 
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where the social/historical constraints of Arab traditionalism were 
broken through, the institutional and extra-economic blockages remained 
in place and were strictly enforced. By design and by fact, the national 
"parent" (Israel) economy has tried to enforce integration/subservience 
and stagnation in order to prevent Arab development. Through 
determination to subsist and uphold a unique identity, the Arab regions 
have maintained a hold on the bare essentials of the resources for 
economic development. 
In this sense, insofar as the Palestinian Arabs in Israel have preserved- 
and often developed-land, labor skills, social infrastructure and 
institutions and even a minimal capital accumulation, they have laid the 
basis and begun the formation of a uniquely Arab economic structure. 
After 36 years, despite the successful establishment and building of the 
Jewish state, the integration/subservience versus segregation/autonomy 
dichotomy still has relevance. 
It is a conflict still to be resolved, but it is clear that the Arab economy 
possesses a dynamic and a resource base of its own. Though this position is 
still threatened, the trends of the past decades seem to have exhausted 
themselves: industry in Arab areas can become no less significant; 
agriculture can contract no more; labor can be no more exploited than it is. 
Many of the disadvantages which worked against the Arab regions in 
earlier years are no longer operative and have been overcome: 
industrialization is perceived as a necessity, agriculture can and will 
continue to adopt new methods and reorganize, while Arab labor can 
adapt and still improve its ~otential .  The Arab economy in Israel is a 
reality with which the Israeli authorities must contend and come to terms. 
Viability, however, is another question altogether, and one which 
requires much more comprehensive research and more accurate data. Yet, 
there are three preliminary hypotheses for future Arab development that 
can be advanced, although the first two of these are dependent on major 
political and legal transformations which appear unlikely in the near 
future. 
It might be economically viable, for example, for a complete 
integration of Arab economic resources and abilities into the Israeli 
economy to be undertaken, aimed at benefitting both national subsections 
of the economy. This would call for substantial investment by the Israeli 
authorities in rural and regional industrialization, intensive cooperativi- 
zation and transformation of Arab agriculture, and the adoption of 
policies that would tap and develop labor skills while causing minimal 
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social hardship. The factories would have to move to the workers, but 
workers would also have to be allowed to move to the factories (on a 
permanent basis where feasible). This would be viable in purely economic 
terms, though obvious social/political/legal transformations (in both 
communities) would have to take effect and numerous barriers be broken 
down. There are no indications that the Israeli authorities are now, or in the 
near future, capable of considering such a strategy. 
Alternatively, it would be economically viable for change to occur 
especially in the Arab sector, aimed at its autonomous development. This 
would take the form of substantial private Arab investment in appropriate 
and competitive industrial processes in Arab regions, an extensive 
modernization of Arab agriculture more or less within its present structure 
and area, and an attempt to make use of Arab comparative advantage in 
relatively cheaper, skilled manual labor potentials, thus helping to 
strengthen social structure by keeping labor at home. This strategy, 
however, is fraught with the problems of its political implications with 
regard to the Israeli system, the substantial financial burden it would entail 
and, to date, the effective absence of any feasible local initiator and author 
of such a policy. However, it remains a viable option, both economically 
and in terms of the social welfare benefits that could accrue. 
Much more relevant to present circumstances than the options 
outlined above is a path which straddles these, much along the same lines 
that the Arab economy has already been developing.76 In a sense, this has 
already proved its viability, at least insofar as its ability to maintain a 
burgeoning population and a minimum of its resource base while allowing 
for the beginnings of the development of new, alternative resources, skills 
and institutional forms. This strategy (effectively an unelaborated one) is a 
sort of "holding action": the Arab economy can maintain what exists 
while building the means for emerging into a position from which it can 
bring to bear its full economic potential on the unequal terms of economic 
production and exchange in Israel. 
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